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ARTICLE
THE VEIL OF FAIR REPRESENTATION:
MAURICE CLARETT V. THE NATIONAL FOOTBALL LEAGUE
By Brando Simeo Starkey
I. INTRODUCTION

He was ready. In 2004, the Ohio State Buckeyes running back,
Maurice Clarett ("Clarett"), contested the National Football League's
("NFL") Special Eligibility rule ("The Rule") mandating that all
potential players must wait three years after their high school class has
graduated to assume eligibility for the NFL Draft. l Clarett was only
two years removed from his high school graduation. New York
federal district court struck down The Rule, concluding that it violated
federal antitrust law. 2 The NFL appealed. 3 The Second Circuit Court
of Appeals, however, held that The Rule was not subject to federal
antitrust laws but to federal labor laws and that The Rule complied
with the latter. 4 When the Supreme Court denied certiorari, Clarett's
dream of playing football on Sundays was deferred for a year. 5
In this paper, I contest that, although the Second Circuit correctly
held that The Rule was subject to federal labor laws, the way in which
those laws operate offends common sense. Moreover, the NFL and
the National Football League Players Association ("NFLPA"), if
acting in the best interest of the league, should voluntarily abrogate
The Rule. First, I will discuss Clarett's brief but impressive career as
an Ohio State tailback. As a dynamic freshman, he led his school to
an undefeated season and its first National Championship in thirty-six
years. Second, I will analyze both the district court and appellate court
decisions, highlighting the nuance that led the Second Circuit to
overturn the lower court's findings. Third, I will call attention to the
conspicuous and fundamental flaw in the manner in which federal
labor laws operate. More specifically, I will challenge the paradoxical
assertion that the NFLPA "has the ability to advantage certain
l.

2.
3.
4.
5.

Clarett v. NFL, 306 F. Supp. 2d 379 (S.D.N.Y. 2004), rev'd, 369 F.3d 124 (2d Cir.
2004).
Id. at 4~8.
Clarett v. NFL, 369 F.3d 124 (2d Cir. 2004).
Id. at 135, 138.
Id. at 130.
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categories of players over others" and can yet still somehow meet "the
duty of fair representation."6 Fourth, using John Rawls' Veil of
Ignorance, found in A Theory of Justice, I will introduce a
philosophical framework by which sports players' associations can
meet the necessary obligation of fair representation and conform to the
way in which federal labor laws should operate. Fifth, this paper takes
a turn, emerging from legal nebulousness, delving into NFL policy
matters, knocking down the reasons for which the NFL and NFLPA
proffer as a basis for the continuation of The Rule. Finally, I will
argue why the NFL and the NFLPA should concentrate on the ability
of the individual, not age, in determining readiness.
II. TRIALS, TRIBULATIONS AND PRISON
Clarett said, "[g]rowing up in Youngstown [Ohio], you don't have
the best opportunities in the world, so you make the most of what you
have."7 And so he did. Clarett, named the Offensive Player of the
Year in America coming out of high school, graduated early with a 3.5
GPA and a 1220 SAT score so that he could start as a freshman in
Ohio State's backfield. s After starting the first game of the season, a
victory, he impressed his coaches and teammates not only with his
physical dominance, but his mental maturity . "You can tell Maurice is
mentally prepared for the college game," freshman linebacker AJ.
Hawk said. Hawk added, "[h]e seems to be a lot older than an 18year-old."9 Indeed, Clarett keenly understood the work ethic requisite
for success. Furthermore, he had an appreciation for the cultural
burdens that accompany socioeconomic ascendancy, commenting,
"[I]f you lived in the hard environment of Youngstown, there is just
some need that pushes you to get out, to get better and then to give
back."ID It was the opinion of those around him that Clarett was a
well-adjusted young man. II
One would be remiss in overlooking Clarett's on-the-field prowess.
His best game came against Washington State, the third game of the
season, in which he amassed 230 yards and scored two rushing
6.
7.

Id. at 139.
Tim May, His Satisfaction Never Guaranteed; Maurice Clarett Constantly Pushes
Himself to Do More, THE COLUMBUS DISPATCH, Sept. 5, 2002, at Dl [hereinafter His
Satisfaction Never Guaranteed].
8. Tim May, OSU Football; Clarett Gets Head Start on Career at Ohio State, THE
COLUMBUS DISPATCH, Jan. 13,2002, at D3.
9. May, His Satisfaction Never Guaranteed, supra note 7.
lO. Id.
11. Id.
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touchdowns. Although he did not have an impressive statistical output
during the National Championship game against the vaunted and
heavily favored Miami Hurricanes, he had two big plays that were
instrumental in the Buckeyes' victory.12
Clarett's sophomore season, however, was an unmitigated, public
calamity. It started out promising with Clarett being mentioned as a
Heisman trophy frontrunner. 13 It was downhill from there. In April of
2003, Clarett's 2001 Chevrolet Monte Carlo was broken into. He filed
a police report, claiming that over $6,000 worth of property was
stolen. 14 After being prodded about the veracity of this claim, Clarett
admitted that he had lied. 15 National Collegiate Athletic Association
("NCAA") investigations ensued. 16 A war of words between Clarett
and Ohio State followed. Ultimately, Clarett's football days at Ohio
State were finished. 17 With seemingly no other alternative, Clarett
decided to go professional but The Rule stood in his way. The courts
were his only recourse. In September of 2003, Clarett announced his
intention to sue the NFL. 18
Clarett ultimately was drafted in the NFL. 19 In April of 2005, he
was drafted by the Denver Broncos. 2o Four months later, he was CUt. 21
After being cut, Clarett was arrested twice. 22 His first arrest was
concerning an alleged aggravated robbery of a brother and sister
outside of a Columbus, Ohio nightclub. 23 His second arrest was
related to a concealed weapons charge after Clarett was pulled over,
again in Columbus.24 At the time, Clarett was out on bond from his
12

13.
14.

15.
16.
17.

Tim May, A Peifect Ending; Buckeyes Once Again Come Up Big When It Counts, THE
COLUMBUS DISPATCH, Jan. 4, 2003, at Sport 2.
Tim May, Clarett Sees Quick Return; Ex-NFL Great Jim Brown on OSU Tailback's
Team as 'Observer' in Process, THE COLUMBUS DISPATCH, Aug. 12, 2003, at E1.
Rob Oller, NCAA Eyes Clarett's Report of Theft; Electronics, Cash Stolen From Car
OSU Tailback Was Driving This Spring, THE COLUMBUS DISPATCH, July 30, 2003, at E1
[hereinafter Report of Theft]·
Rob Oller, Eligibility Questions Send Clarett to Sidelines; Running Back Admits He
Inflated Prices of Items Stolen from Car, THE COLUMBUS DISPATCH, July 31, 2003, at D 1
Oller, Report of Theft, supra note 14.
Rob Oller, Clarett Sues NFL to Turn Pro Next Year; Sophomore Can Preserve OSU
Option if He Stays in School, THE COLUMBUS DISPATCH, Sept. 24, 2003, at AI.

18. Id.
19. Bruce Cadwallader and John Frutty, Clarett Gets at Least 3lh years; Former OSU Star
Settles All Cases Against Him by Agreeing to Plea Deal, THE COLUMBUS DISPATCH, Sept.
19,2006, at Al [hereinafter At Least 3 Y2 years].

20. Id.
21. Id.

22. Id.
23. Id.
24. Id.
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previous arrest,25 and police noticed him driving erratically.26 When
the police finally managed to pull Clarett over, he had an open bottle
of vodka, an AK-47, thirty live rounds in the magazine, three pistols, a
hatchet and was wearing a Kevlar bullet-proof vest. 27 In September of
2006, Clarett pled guilty to both charges and will see freedom no
sooner than three and a half years. 28
III. THE CASE -- CLARETT V. NFL
This section discusses Maurice Clarett v. National Football League
at both the district court and appellate levels. The differing legal
conclusions will be dissected, ending with an explanation of the
Second Circuit's reasoning for overturning the lower court's ruling.

A. The District Court Opinion
On September 23,2003, Clarett filed suit against the NFL claiming
antitrust injury. He was being denied the right to earn a living because
of his age. 29 Both parties subsequently filed Motions for Summary
Judgment. Clarett argued that The Rule violated antitrust law. The
NFL claimed that Clarett "'lacked antitrust standing' and that, as a
matter of law, the eligibility rules were immune from antitrust attack
by virtue of the non-statutory labor exemption."30
The district court had three arguments that led to the conclusion
that Clarett had antitrust standing. First, the district court dismissed
the NFL's position that antitrust laws were not controlling with respect
to The Rule because it fell within a non-statutory labor exemption to
antitrust law. 3l The district court held following Mackey v. National
Football League 32 that antitrust law was applicable. 33 Under Mackey,
eligibility rules "are not mandatory subjects of collective bargaining,"
the rules "affect only 'complete strangers to the bargaining
relationships," and the rules "were not shown to be the product of
arm's-length negotiation."34
25. Bruce Cadwallader, $6.1 Million Bond; New Charges Won't Delay Clarett's Trial, THE
COLUMBUS DISPATCH, Aug. 11,2006, at El [hereinafter $6.1 Million Bond].
26. Cadwallader, At Least 3 V2 years, supra note 19.
27. Cadwallader, $6.1 Million Bond, supra note 25.
28. Cadwallader, At Least 3 V2 years, supra note 19.
29. Clarett, 306 F. Supp. 2d at 382.
30. Clarett, 369 F.3d at 129.
31. 1d.
32. 543 F.2d 606 (8th Cir. 1976).
33. Clarett, 369 F.3d at 129.
34. 1d.
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Second, the district court rejected the NFL's contention that Clarett
did not show a satisfactory "antitrust injury" to have a cause of action
and, even if The Rule was subject to federal antitrust law, Clarett was
not injured by its presence. 35 The district court held that the "inability
to compete in the market," (the market being on the NFL playing
field) was enough to establish an injury for antitrust purposes. 36
Third, the district court concluded that the antitrust injury Clarett
suffered, being disallowed from the NFL draft, was patent and the
justifications for The Rule that the NFL proffered failed to mask its
glaring anticompetitive nature. 37 The NFL argued that young players
have an elevated susceptibility to both physical and mental dangers
from which the NFL should protect them. 38 The Rule is designed to
confront said dangers. With The Rule in place, the NFL is able to put
forth a better product for public consumption than it could without The
Rule. 39 No one would, after all, want to spend their money on a
sporting event full of young, often injured, immature players. As
cogent as this justification may be, it was not adequate as a matter of
law. 40 The NFL could, furthermore, address these potential problems
with other means that were not violative of antitrust law. 41 With The
Rule no longer in place, there was no impediment to Clarett being
eligible for the NFL draft. On February 5, 2004, the court granted
Summary Judgment in favor of Clarett. 42 The district court entered an
order stating Clarett was eligible43 and allowed him to enter the NFL
draft.
B. Overturned - The Second Circuit Opinion

While the district court held that The Rule was subject to and
antagonistic to antitrust law, the Second Circuit came to the opposite
conclusion. 44 The Second Circuit held that the "labor market for NFL
players is organized around a collective bargaining relationship that is
provided for and promoted by federal labor law, and that the NFL

35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.

42.
43.
44.

Id.
Id. (quoting Clarett, 306 F. Supp. 2d at 403).
Clarett, 369 F.3d at 129.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 130.
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clubs as a multi-employer bargaining unit"45 can get together "in
setting the terms and conditions of players' employment and the rules
of the sport without risking antitrust liability."46 In other words, while
the district court held that antitrust law was applicable, the Second
Circuit rejected that holding, concluding that the relationship between
the NFL and NFLPA was subject to a non-statutory antitrust
exemption and therefore governed by federal labor laws with which it
complied. 47
The district court relied on Mackey in its conclusion that the NFL's
eligibility rule did not meet one of the non-statutory exemptions to
antitrust law. 48 The Mackey factors, argued the Second Circuit, do not
provide the "proper guideposts," when the challenge is that the
eligibility rule is "an unreasonable restraint upon the market for
player's services."49 Mackey guidelines should have been followed
had Clarett argued "that the NFL's draft eligibility rules work to the
disadvantage of the NFL's competitors in the market for professional
football or in some manner protect the NFL's dominance in that
market." 50 In short, the Clarett and Mackey decisions dealt with two
separate legal questions. The district court erroneously conflated the
two issues.
The issues in Caldwell v. American Basketball Association,
National Basketball Association v. Williams and Wood v. National
Basketball Association5l are all analogous to Clarett's contention that
the NFL was engaging in behavior tantamount to a "restraint upon the
labor market for players' services and thus violated the antitrust laws .
"52

In all those cases, the Second Circuit held that the non-statutory
labor exemption extinguished each player's claim. 53 The court's
"analysis in each case was rooted in the observation that the
relationships among the defendant sports leagues and their players
45. Id. A bargaining unit. in this instance. is an entity comprised of different teams that come
together to negotiate with the NFLP A.
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. Id. at 120 (citing Clarett. 306 F. Supp. 2d at 397).
49. Clarett. 369 F.3d at 134.
50. Id.
51. Caldwell. 66 F.3d 523. 526-27 (2d Cir. 1995); Williams. 45 F.3d 684.687 (2d Cir. 1995);
Wood. 809 F.2d 954.956-58 (2d Cir. 1987) (noting these cases all concern the legal issue
of a plaintiff arguing against being restrained by a unionized labor market that has a
collective bargaining agreement relationship with a multi-employer bargaining entity).
52. Clarett. 369 F.3d at 135.
53. Claret. 369 F.3d at 134-35.
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were governed by collective bargaining agreements and thus were
subject to carefully structured regimes established by federal labor
laws."54
After holding that The Rule was subject to federal labor laws and
not antitrust laws, the issue before the court was then whether it was in
compliance with the former. 55 The Second Circuit held the arguments
to back Clarett's antitrust cause of action "run counter to each of these
basic principles of federal labor law."56 First, because the NFL players
are a union that decided to have the NFLPA as its bargaining
representative, Clarett was forbidden by labor law from directly
negotiating conditions of his employment with any NFL team. 57 The
terms and conditions of Clarett's employment with regard to the NFL
must be determined by negotiations between the NFLPA and the
NFL. 58
Second, the NFLPA, as a player's union, possesses powers
analogous to that of a legislative body insofar as it may restrict and
create "the rights of those whom it represents."59 When searching for
the most advantageous deal for NFL players, the representative can
give preference to certain categories of players over others, which is
subject to the representative's duty of fair representation. 5O This ability
to advantage certain categories of players over others is vested in the
players' representative whenever "a mandatory collective bargaining
relationship is established and continues throughout the relationship."61
After a collective bargaining relationship commences, federal labor
law then provides the legal fulcrum through which problems are
settled. 62
Third, Clarett argues that because eligibility rules are not a
mandatory subject of collective bargaining, the "scheme established
by federal labor law" can be avoided in favor of antitrust law. 63 The

54. Clarett, 369 F.3d at 135 (noting that if there are exemptions to antitrust law, they are
provided by statute. If a legal issue meets one of those statutory exemptions, antitrust law
does not govern - federal labor law does).
55. Id. at 136-37.
56. Id. at 138.
57. Id.
58. Id. at 139.
59. Id. at 139 (quoting Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Indep. Fed'n of Flight Attendants, 489
U.S. 426, 459 (1989».
60. Clarett, 369 F.3d at 139 (citing Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 177 (1967».
61. Clarett, 369 F.3d at 139 (quoting Caldwell, 66 F.3d at 528).
62. Clarett, 369 F.3d at 139 (citing Caldwell, 66 F.3d at 529).
63. Clarett, 369 F.3d at 139.
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district court agreed with this contention. 64 The Second Circuit
rejected it, holding that eligibility rules are indeed a mandatory
bargaining subject that has ramifications on the NFL players' working
conditions and wages. 65 Sports leagues are configured in such a way
that although certain issues might not seemingly affect wages and
working conditions, upon further reflection they actually do. 66 The age
at which players gain eligibility has countless ramifications on the
competition of current players, salary caps, and salary pools for
rookies. 67
Additionally, Clarett argues that the eligibility rules are not
permissible because they affect potential players that are not even
members of the NFLPA. 68 But within the confines of a collective
bargaining relationship, the NFLP A and the NFL can decide that a
player is ineligible as long as it does not violate federal laws
prohibiting unfair labor practices or discrimination. 69 As discussed in
Reliance Insurance v. National Labor Relations Board, an "[Employer
is usually free to] pick and choose his employees and hire those he
thinks will best serve his business interests."7o The Rule, it was held,
was a lawful collective bargaining stipulation. 71
Clarett counters by noting that The Rule predates the collective
bargaining agreement and the NFLPA and the NFL never bargained
over it. 72 In order to comply with federal labor law, The Rule had to
have been bargained over. 73 If it was not, it does not meet the nonstatutory exemptions to antitrust law. 74 The Second Circuit found this
argument unpersuasive. 75 "Given that the eligibility rules are a
mandatory bargaining subject ... the union or the NFL could have
forced the other to the bargaining table if either felt that a change was
warranted."76
National Football League Management Council's
("NFLMC") Vice President for Labor Relations, Peter Ruocco, claims
64.
65.
66.
67.

68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.

76.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 140.
Id. (explaining that eligibility does indeed have huge ramifications on wages and working
conditions) .
Id.
Id. at l4l.
Id. at 141 (quoting Reliance Ins. Co. v. NLRB, 415 F.2d 1, 6 (8th Cir. 1969».
Clarett, 369 F.3d at l4l.
Id. at 142.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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that this is what actually transpired. 77 In conclusion, the collective
bargaining agreement between the NFL and NFLP A is subject to
federal labor laws and not antitrust laws. 78 The Rule conforms to the
former. 79
IV. THE FEDERAL LABOR LAW QUANDARY
The tension between the district court and appellate decisions was
whether or not antitrust law or federal labor law was controlling. 8o The
Second Circuit overruled the lower court, holding that federal labor
law was controlling, and that The Rule was in compliance. 8l Whether
or not the Second Circuit solved the issue correctly in Clarett is not
the issue with which this paper is concerned. For the purposes of this
paper, it is assumed that the Second Circuit's resolution of the issue
was correct. Indeed, it is conceded that the eligibility rule between the
NFLP A and the NFL is governed by federal labor law not antitrust law
and that federal labor law allows for a union to implement a rule that is
tantamount to an age restriction. 82 The legal argument this paper
attempts to make is that federal labor law allows representatives of a
collective bargaining agreement to come to unjust age eligibility
requirements. The Second Circuit did not get it wrong; federal labor
law got it wrong. To argue this point, federal labor law needs
exploration.
As previously noted, the NFLPA is allowed to entrust a person with
the power to act as a representative that bargains on behalf of players'
rights. 83
The representative has "powers comparable to those
possessed by a legislative body both to create and restrict the rights of
those whom it represents."84 "Congress gave to the ... representative
the task of harmonizing and adjusting the conflicting interests of
employees within the bargaining unit, no matter how diverse their
skills, experience, age, race or economic level."85 Coming to a good
agreement is, obviously, a very arduous task where there are members
of the union that have disparate interests. 86 Not everyone will arise
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.

Id.
Id. at 143.
Id.
Id. at 125.
Id. at 143.
Id.
Id. at 139.
Steele v. Louisville & Nashville R.R. Co., 323 U.S. 192,202 (1944).
Wood, 809 F.2d at 960.
Id.

26

University of Baltimore Law Forum

[Vol. 37

from the bargaining table completely satisfied; indeed total complete
contentedness of all those represented is not a realistic occurrence. 87
The representative, however, has to meet the obvious standards of
fair representation. 88 That is to say, if the representative is not
representing all of the employees "fairly," the standards of federal
labor law are not met. 89 The definition of employee includes any
employee, and is not constrained to the employees of a certain
employer. 90 Additionally, job applicants are "employees."91 There is a
tripartite test when evaluating claims of unfair representation in
collective bargaining agreements. 92 "A breach of the statutory duty of
fair representation occurs only when a union's conduct toward a
member of the collective bargaining unit is arbitrary, discriminatory,
or in bad faith."93
With respect to the arbitrariness of fair representation, it occurs
"only if [the union's conduct] can be fairly characterized as so far
outside a 'wide range of reasonableness' that it is wholly 'irrational' or
'arbitrary.' "94 The sort of representation that constitutes "arbitrary" is
purposefully broad. 95 Indeed, "This 'wide range of reasonableness'
gives the union room to make discretionary decisions and choices,
even if those judgments are ultimately wrong."96 In Air Line Pilots
Association v. O'Neill, for example, a settlement agreement was
negotiated by the union with the employer, which hindsight showed to
be a terrible deal for the employees. 97 The union had negotiated a
disastrous agreement for its workers. However, this was not enough to
support a holding that the union's conduct was arbitrary.98 A union's
conduct can be classified as arbitrary only when it is irrational,
meaning when it is without a rational basis or explanation. 99

87.
88.
89.
90.
9l.

92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99

Ford Motor Co. v. Huffman, 345 U.S. 330, 338 (1953).
Vaca, 386 U.S. at 177 (1967).
Id. at 178.
National Labor Relations Act §§ 8(a)(1), (3), 49 Stat. 452 (codified as amended at 29
U.S.C. §§ 152(1), (3) (1988».
Time-O-Matic, Inc. v. NLRB, 264 F.2d 96, 99 (7th Cir. 1959); John Hancock Mut. Life
Ins. Co. v. NLRB, 191 F.2d 483,485 (D.C. Cir. 1951).
Vaca, 386 U.S. at 177.
Id.
Air Line Pilots Ass'n v. O'Neill, 499 U.S. 65, 78 (1991) (quoting Huffman, 345 U.S. at
338).
Huffman, 345 U.S. at 338.
Marquez v. Screen Actors Guild, 525 U.S. 33,45-46 (1998).
O'Neill, supra note 94, at 7l.
Id. at 78-8l.
Id. at 67.
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If a union practices discrimination in its representation of
employees the condition of fair representation is violated. loo In Steele
v. Louisville & Railroad Co., for instance, the union and employer
reached an agreement that discriminated against minority workers with
respect to hiring and seniority rights. 10l Such a deal struck by the
union was said to have been tainted because of its discriminatory
character, failing to meet the duties of fair representation. lo2
The third prong of this tripartite system for analyzing fair
representation is bad faith. 103 Courts have held that bad faith "requires
a showing of fraud, deceitful action, or dishonest action."104 Merely
demonstrating that the Union did not represent an employee as
vigorously as possible is insufficient to establish a violation. IDS Just
merely showing bad faith is not enough for an employee to have a
claim. Ackley v. Western Conference of Teamsters held that "to
prevail on a fair representation claim, plaintiffs, in addition to
establishing that a union acted unreasonably and in bad faith, must
allege a causal connection between the union's wrongful conduct and
the alleged injuries."lo6 There are, therefore, two parts. First, it must
be proved that the union acted in bad faith.107 Second, it must be
proved that whichever wrong that was initially proved caused the
injuries in question. !Os
The Second Circuit, in Clarett, held that the NFLPA can meet the
duty of fair representation despite a stipulation in the collective
bargaining agreement that disallows certain members because of their
age. 109 As discussed supra, for the purposes of this paper, it is
assumed that the Second Circuit resolved whether or not the necessity
of fair representation was met correctly. That is, where a sports
players' union decides that it is in the union's best interest to
effectively agree to an age limit, they have not broken the duty of fair
representation toward persons who actually have the talent to play at
the level. It, however, should.
100. Steele. 323 U.S. at 194-202.
101. Id.
102.Id.
103. Vaca. 386 U.S. at 177.
104. Mock v. T.G. & Y. Stores Co., 971 F.2d 522,531 (lath Cir. 1992) (quoting Motor Coach
Employees v. Lockridge, 403 U.S. 274, 299 (1971).
105. Mock, 971 F.2d at 53l.
106. Ackley, 958 F.2d 1463, 1472 (9th Cir. 1992).
107.Id.
108.Id.
109. Clarett, 369 F.3d at 139.
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Federal labor law should not allow a union to exclude workers who
are clearly able to perform and still meet the requirement of "fair
representation." There is nothing fair about a union that favors current
players over future players to such an extent that it disallows future
players' entry into employment with an arbitrary rule requiring players
to wait three years after graduating from high school.
V. REAL FAIRNESS
The duty of fair representation is not met only "when a union's
conduct toward a member of the collective bargaining unit is arbitrary,
discriminatory, or in bad faith."llo Where in Clarett, a union, who
represents both future players and current ones promotes the interests
of one over the other to the degree that the NFLP A does, the duty of
fair representation should not be met. III I reject the notion that a
union, who represents future employees as well as current ones, can
agree to a collective bargaining agreement that contains an age
eligibility requirement and still meet the federal labor law duty of "fair
representation."
In all other respects, the tripartite system of
discerning whether fair representation has been met makes for good
policy.
However, when it comes to eligibility rules, it is
conspicuously unfair. The question then becomes as follows: What
should constitute fair representation with respect to age limits when a
union is negotiating a collective bargaining agreement?
My
contention is that the union should proceed under the veil of ignorance
theory.

A. Veil of Ignorance
Under John Rawls' theory, the veil of ignorance,ll2 the rules of
justice are chosen in the original position, behind a "veil of
ignorance," that conceals facts from the parties about themselves
(gender, age, race etc.) that would likely be used as attempts to tailor
the rules to engender an advantage. 113 If behind the veil of ignorance
we do not know our race, for instance, then we will not desire to
implement rules that favor one race over the other. In the real world
we know these key facts: "that in reasoning about justice we must
disregard some of what we know ... pretend to ourselves that we don't
110. Vaca, 386 U.S. at 190.
Ill. Clarett, 369 F.3d at 139.
112. JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE (The Belknap Press of Harvard Univ. Press 1971).
113. John
Kilcullen,
Rawls:
The
Original
Position
(1996),
http://www.humanities.mq.edu.au/Ockhamly64Ll3.htm1(last visited Nov. 15,2006).
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know it . . . To ask what rules would people behind the veil of
ignorance adopt is a way of asking what rules can be justified without
reference to bargaining strengths and weaknesses."114
The goal of the veil of ignorance is to put people in a position
where they are likely to disavow their prejudices and set up rules that
are the fairest possible. ll5 Under the veil of ignorance, one does not
know his plight in life. Indeed, he knows nothing about himself. He
does not know how the rules he chooses will affect his own
situation. 116 People in the original position would adopt various
positions and principles, but the pertinent principle is the second
principle which is as follows:
Social and economic inequalities are to be arranged so
that they are both:
(a) to the greatest benefit of the least advantaged ...
(b) attached to offices and positions open to all under
conditions of fair equality of opportunity.l17
B. Veil of Ignorance Applied to Facts

The veil of ignorance is a philosophical theory about the world at
large and needs to be adopted in the instant case. Therefore, the
question is as follows: if one knew that he was a potential player and
did not know his age, but that he could play in the NFL, what is the
eligibility rule for which this person would advocate?
In this position, the hypothetical person would advocate for open
rules. That is, he would not favor any age restriction. He does not
know his age and if he felt he could play football at nineteen-years-old
he surely would not want an impediment standing in his way. It is
foreseeable, for example, that someone has the talent to play in the
NFL at age nineteen, but if there is a rule impeding this, he would
have to wait, risking injury. Indeed, there are various scenarios that
could result in a detriment to a player that does not meet a
predetermined age standard. The answer is clear. Under the veil of
ignorance, no one would argue for an eligibility requirement.
The NFL might likely want to implement an eligibility impediment
to stop young players from entering the league, but the NFLP A would
at least have to challenge the NFL on that issue to meet the duty of fair
114.Id.
115.Id.
116. Dennis C. Mueller. Defining Citizenship. 3 THEORETICAL INQ. L. 151. 156 (2002).
117. Kilcullen. supra note 113.
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representation. Here, the NFLPA did not even challenge the NFL on
The Rule. Any union that fails to fight for inclusive measures, with
respect to the age of employees, breaks the veil of ignorance and
therefore should violate the duty of fair representation.
VI. THE NFL'S ARGUMENTS
Then Washington Redskins linebacker La V ar Arrington, voiced
vehement disapproval regarding Clarett's potential presence on the
professional football field. lIS He said that if he saw him on the football
field, he would try to take his head off.119 His aggressive position
towards Clarett was emblematic of an overreaching argument
concerning young players in the NFL. They are not ready either
mentally or physically, and to allow them on the football field with
men is to render them susceptible to all types of peril. 120 To be an NFL
player, you must be a man. A man, so the argument goes, has a
certain type of body that can withstand the brutality that is
professional football. Moreover, a man can deal with the turbulent,
grueling nature of an NFL season, and the effects on the psyche,
including the ability to deal with the media scrutiny and heightened
public attention that accompanies an NFL contract. A boy cannot deal
with this. In Clarett, the NFL stated that the first reason for The Rule
was because it was in young football players' best interest to wait until
they had matured before they entered the NFL. 121
Columnist and ESPN personality Michael Wilbon agreed that
Clarett was not ready for the NFL. 122 Wilbon concludes that there have
only been three NFL players that could have played at an age at which
The Rule forbids. 123 These three players are Herschel Walker (running
back from University of Georgia), Bo Jackson (running back from
Auburn University) and Marcus Dupree (running back from Oklahoma
University).l24 Clarett is not ready for the NFL, he scribes, and will
quickly find himself out of the league. If he were to stay in college,
mature both physically and mentally, Clarett would be setting himself
up in the best way possible for success at the next level. 125

118. Michael Wilbon, For Clarett, It's a Bad Move, WASH. POST, Sept. 25, 2003, at D 1.
ll9.Id.
120. Clarett, 306 F. Supp. 2d at 408.
121. Id.
122. Wilbon, supra note ll8.
123.Id.
124.Id.
125.Id.
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Wilbon endorses The Rule stating that the NFL will be overrun
with overly ambitious nineteen-year olds, destroying the high quality
product that makes it undisputedly the most popular sport in
America. 126 The NFL agreed, making this their second argument in
buttressing the need for The Rule. 127 The Rule, the NFL maintained,
safeguards the NFL from the potential disastrous byproduct associated
with young players entering a league for which they are not physically
or emotionally ready.128
The NFL's final argument 129 in support of The Rule was the
league's desire to curb steroid use by young men hoping to one day
become an NFL player. The Rule was "protecting from injury and
self-abuse other adolescents who would over train- and use
steroids-in the misguided hope of developing prematurely the
strength and speed required to play in the NFL."130 It is an interesting
argument, but one that essentially asks potentially qualified workers to
give up millions of dollars so that high school adolescent boys are not
tempted to engage in illegal and unethical behavior.
The position that the NFL wants to discourage young men from
taking steroids to enter the league is an honorable one. Steroid use
among amateur athletes is of national concern. The NFL, however, is
undeniably hypocritical on this issue. Eventually drafted in the first
round of the 2005 NFL draft, Luis Castillo tested positive for a steroid
at a pre-draft workout. l3l If the NFL's desire was truly to send a
message that steroid use has no place in the NFL and, additionally,
instill in amateur football players that steroids should not be taken
under any circumstances, the NFL could have taken punitive measures
against Castillo. But, they did not. Taking the NFL at their word, they
let an opportunity to convey their altruistic intentions regarding
amateur athletes and steroids slip by. He was drafted in the second
round.
Young players, quite simply are not ready, is the most deployed
argument in support of The Rule from a policy standpoint. While it is
true that most of the players The Rule excludes are likely not ready to
126.Id.
127.Id.
128. Clarett, 306 F. Supp. 2d at 408.
129.Id. The third argument is excluded but it pertains to the NFL's desire to protect teams
from the costs of young players that might potentially get injured because they were not
physically ready to play.
130.Id.
131. Mark Maske, NFL Keeps Ephedra on Prohibited List, WASH. POST, Apr. 15,2005, at DS.
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make meaningful contributions to an NFL team, the NFL already has a
natural and easy remedy to this potential disaster. They do not need to
draft such players. A novel concept it seems to many of the NFL's
decision makers, but it is unequivocally a perfect panacea. On draft
day, had Clarett been eligible, any team viewing him as obviously too
young would have had the option to pass on him. In order for young
players to ruin the league, they first have to be in the league. The NFL
conveniently overlooks their responsibility and posture insomuch as
they are in a position to bottleneck the potential problem by not
drafting players they conclude are not ready.
One likely retort is that teams might be so tantalized by the talent of
a nineteen-year-old sensation reminiscent of John Elwat32 that teams
may draft him anyway, despite the fact that he is not mature enough to
make a valuable contribution. Other teams might likewise be
enamored with other prodigies. The fear, then, is that these players
will not materialize and teams will be hurt by poor draft day decisions.
If this happens, on a large scale, then naturally the NFL suffers. No
one, after all, would want to watch the NFL if it were rife with young
players that should actually be playing on Saturdays. 133 With the
decreased interest, the NFL would be a less prosperous league. The
NFL, therefore, would be smart to restrict the flow of players whose
mere presence would attenuate the quality of the league.
The peculiarity of this position, of course, is that teams currently
get enamored by the talent of a twenty-two-year old sensation
reminiscent of John Elway who is not mature enough to handle the
NFL game. Joey Harrington, Akili Smith and Kyle Bollerl34 have
analogous career trajectories because they were drafted early on full of
promise. They all were unmitigated calamities. The NFL's response
to these underperforming players was not to place a policy roadblock
that impeded them in competing. The fear that teams have regarding
players The Rule excludes are the same fears they have with the
players The Rule includes. The solution is not to increase the age at
which players become eligible, but to be more accurate in scouting
college talent and predicting how that talent will project at the next
level. The NFL's argument is essentially a save-ourselves-from-

132. John Elway is often esteemed as one of the best quarterbacks in NFL history. He was the
number one draft pick in the 1983 NFL draft.
133. College football is traditionally played on Saturdays.
134. All three of these quarterbacks were drafted early in the first round of the NFL draft.
None of them materialized.
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ourselves position. The best way these teams can save themselves is
to be smart in evaluating the talent and character of draft prospects.
There are obvious strands of paternalism that are interwoven with
the arguments given in support of The Rule. One might argue that
these athletes should not be allowed to play until they reach a certain
level of objective maturity. Coming out too early will ruin their
careers.
It is an undoubtedly a logical argument that, for most
players, rings true. But should this be the NFL's decision to make? Is
it a smart decision to allow the NFL to make a blanket rule that affects
all players?
No, the NFL should not stand in the way of individual choice, no
matter how much they believe their opinion is right. People should be
allowed to choose their own path in life. If they fail, if they did not do
everything possible to succeed, the fault lies with them. In my
opinion, America is very reticent to adopt a paternalistic orientation
towards people's vocation. Indeed, setting race and class aside,
America generally has egalitarian principles regarding employment.
The NFL should align itself with this traditional American principle as
opposed to adopting a policy that excludes even those players that are
capable.
VII. THE RULE HURTS THE NFL
The NFL has already reached dominance in America. The next
step is to market the league around the world. It is, however, an
arduous task. The biggest obstacle the NFL has in selling its product
to international consumers is that the NFL does not have star power.
That is, without popular players to sell in foreign markets, the NFL
will not have great success internationally. To be sure the NFL does
have great players, the NFL just does not sell them to the extent that
other leagues do. The NBA, for instance, is able to market its game
around the world because they have actively sold their most prominent
players. The NFL, conversely, sells teams. 135 The NBA, during the
1992 Olympics in Barcelona, advanced the popularity of basketball
greatly with The Dream Team. l36 Admittedly, American football is not
an Olympic sport, so the NFL does not have that wonderful
135. The saying is that the NFL sells the jerseys and the NBA sells the players. The saying
stems from the diverging marketing strategies between the two leagnes. The NBA sells
the fans their stars, and the NFL its teams.
136. Jack McCallum, USA Inc. The High-flying Americans Are Also Scoring Big in the
Marketing Game, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED, July 1992 at 124. The Dream Team was the
name given to the 1992 USA Men's Olympic team.
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opportunity to sell its game in a global competition. The point,
however, is that showcasing your players to the world is a requisite to
expanding the game into foreign countries.
The NFL has already begun the process of garnering more revenue
internationally. The creation of NFL Europe was a big step in
augmenting the popularity of the league in Europe. The NFL Europe
is a developmental league for NFL teams. Teams send players to the
league to gain experience. The NFL also played its first regular
season game out of the country in 2005. 137 That contest, featuring the
San Francisco 4gers and the Arizona Cardinals set the league's record
for attendance at 103,467 in Mexico City's Azteca StadiumYs But, as
ESPN's Len Pasquerelli notes, "the NFL still isn't as global a
professional sports entity as, say, the NBA, and might never be."139
Here is where The Rule comes in. People are fascinated with
young athletes with impressive talent. It is compelling to see a
nineteen-year-old kid compete against thirty-year-old men and excel.
Few things in sports are as instinctively captivating. It is the Lebron
James effect. 140 Young players are so hyped up that, before their first
game, they are already marketable stars.
Indeed, they are so
marketable that people want to tune in just to see what the hype is
about. With these, essentially ready made stars, the NFL increases its
ability to sell its product overseas. The NFL is a few stars away from
making a significant splash into the global market.
The argument is not that, with The Rule abrogated, offshore
markets will suddenly and miraculously open up. The argument is
that, with a few of young prodigy-esque players, it will be easier to
sell the game abroad. It is not the panacea to the problem, but having
young stars in the NFL will help in advancing the game into other
countries. It will also increase the NFL's popularity here, but the
NFL's more imperative task in expanding is global. With a slight
marketing shift, a shift that attempts to sell its players more, the NFL
will make better headway into the global market.

137. Len Pasquarelli, Hali Among Many African Born Players Drafted, Espn.com, May 5,
2006,
available
at
http://pwxy.espn.go.comlnfllcolumns/story?columnist=pasquarelli_len&id=2434221 (last
visited Nov. 14,2006).
138.Id.
139.Id.
140. Lebron James is a guard for the Cleveland Cavaliers. He was drafted straight from high
school and became an instant fan attraction, in large part due to his young age.
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In addition to helping the NFL in a pecuniary capacity, gaining
popularity in foreign countries also helps in procuring talent from
other countries, increasing the league's talent pool. Also, it gives
countries a player to root for which feeds back in to increasing the
league's popularity around the world. Currently, the overwhelming
majority of players come from America. The league does have players
coming from a wide range of countries, particularly those in Africa
and the American Samoa. 141 To be sure, there have been recent strides
in the ethnic diversification of NFL players, but with increased
popularity abroad, those strides can be dwarfed.
VIII. CONCLUSION
The duty of fair representation mandated by federal labor laws with
regards to age eligibility does not operate in any fashion consistent
with the word fair. A union arguing on behalf of employees should
have to advocate against an eligibility requirement if it wants to meet
the requirement of fair representation. It cannot, as here, acquiesce.
Such a union stance would violate the theoretical principles of the veil
of ignorance - a theory adopted 142 to arrive at a true sense of fairness
and justice. Moreover, the NFL proffers flawed policy arguments in
favor of The Rule. Indeed, each and every reason the NFL gives for
maintaining The Rule is fundamentally flawed. Finally, the NFL does
itself a disservice by not abating their age restriction. Without The
Rule, the NFL will place itself in a better position to garner
international popularity, a paramount concern for the league.

141. See Pasquarelli, supra note 137.
142. The "Veil of Ignorance'" has been used countless times in legal literature to make various
arguments from fairness in the health care industry to duties of professionalism. See
Russell Korobkin, Determining Health Care Rights from Behind a Veil of Ignorance,
1998 U. ILL. L. REv. 801 (1998); Susan R. Martyn, Professionalism: Behind a Veil of
Ignorance, 24 U. ToL. L. REv. 189 (1992).

